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Abstract
Despite support from and for right-wing elements and a deep-seated national history of
anti-Semitism, the policies of the Russian government under Vladimir Putin have been
markedly devoid of anti-Semitism. Appeals to nationalist, imperialist, and Eurasianist
ideologies, pragmatic politics, and foreign policy concerns fail to explain these policies
DGHTXDWHO\ 7KH ELRJUDSK\ RI 3XWLQ KLPVHOI ZKLFK LQFOXGHV LQXHQWLDO SRVLWLYH
UHODWLRQVKLSVZLWK-HZVSURYLGHVDEHWWHUH[SODQDWLRQ7KHSHUVRQDOL]HGLQXHQFHRIWKH
president on Jewish policy suggests a personalized, hyper-centralized regime generally.

Introduction
The Vladimir Putin government and regime72 could be reasonably expected to be
RFLDOO\DQGYLUXOHQWO\DQWL6HPLWLF%RWKWKHPDMRUUHJLPHVWKDWSUHFHGHGLWWKH6RYLHW
8QLRQDQGWKH5RPDQRYG\QDVW\ZHUHRFLDOO\DQWL6HPLWLFDQGDFWLYHO\SHUVHFXWHG
Jews inside their territory, often singling them about above other minorities for special
mistreatment. The Russian population is also widely considered anti-Semitic, thanks
in part to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and libels sometimes peddled by the
Russian Orthodox Church. The KGB (along with its successor, the FSB), in which
3XWLQDFKLHYHGERWKKLVUVWUHDOMREDQGKLVULVHWRSRZHUZHUHDUHQRWRULRXVO\DQWL
6HPLWLF5HFHQWVFKRODUVKLSKDVXQFRYHUHGWKHLQXHQFHDQGSUHYDOHQFHRIULJKWZLQJ
ideologies in Russia, including among some elements of the political elite, as well as
Russian support for far-right politics in the West, especially in Europe. Each of these
features independently would suggest an anti-Semitic government.
,QUHDOLW\KRZHYHUWKH3XWLQJRYHUQPHQWLVQRWRFLDOO\DQWL6HPLWLFDQGWKHXQRFLDO
DQWL6HPLWLVPRIVRPHRILWVRFLDOVDSSHDUVWREHOLPLWHGDQGDVWULFWO\SHUVRQDODV
opposed to part of government policy. This paper will examine the historical precedent
RI RFLDO VWDWH DQWL6HPLWLVP LQ 5XVVLD FRQWUDVW WKLV ZLWK WKH 3XWLQ JRYHUQPHQWӵV
policies, and outline possible explanations for those policies using existing research.
6HYHUDO WKHRULHV DUH SUHVHQWHG DQG HYDOXDWHG LQFOXGLQJ WKH LQXHQFH RI ULJKWZLQJ
ideologies, the Kremlin’s propagandistic use of political ideas, the sociological nature
72

For the purposes of this paper, the governments of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev are
inseparable from the regime centered around Vladimir Putin that has undoubtedly emerged in
Russia. See Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia7KHWHUPVӷJRYHUQPHQWӸDQGӷUHJLPHӸDUHXVHG
interchangeably.
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RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ 5XVVLDQ SRSXODU DQWL6HPLWLVP DQG QDOO\ WKH LQXHQFH RI 3XWLQ
KLPVHOI :KLOH QR H[SODQDWLRQ LV SHUIHFW WKH LQXHQFH RI WKH SHUVRQDOLW\ RI WKH
president on Russian Jewish policy appears decisive. This is likely the case for other
policy domains as well.

Historical precedent
Based on the precedent established by nearly all the preceding leaders of Russia, it would
be unsurprising if Putin were to support anti-Semitic ideas inside and outside Russia.
His pre-Soviet predecessors, the Romanov tsars, embraced stridently anti-Semitic
policies, including the Pale of Settlement, state-sanctioned or state-enabled pogroms,
and exclusion of Jews from many kinds of business and government.735XVVLDQRFLDOV
capped the number of Jewish doctors in the army, limited movement within the Pale of
Settlement, placed strict quotas on Jewish placement in universities, and restricted the
DFWLYLWLHVRI-HZLVKODZ\HUVDPRQJQXPHURXVRWKHUGLVFULPLQDWRU\DFWLRQVӸ74 Perhaps
PRVW IDPRXVO\ WKH 5XVVLDQ VHFUHW SROLFH RU 2NKUDQD ̸̳̣̰̣̑  LV EHOLHYHG WR KDYH
originally fabricated eȅǲXȵȤȿȤǨȤȘȸȤǾȿȅǲȘǮǲȵȸȤǾȈȤȞ.75
Many of these policies were adopted under Alexander III, who sought to revise some
RIKLVIDWKHUӵVUHIRUPVDQGUHLQVWDWHWKHUVWJRYHUQLQJLGHRORJ\RI5XVVLDӷ2UWKRGR[\
$XWRFUDF\DQG1DWLRQDOLW\Ӹ ӷ̴̨̳̣̥̱̮̣̥̫̒Ӱ̧̨̨̣̯̱̳̩̣̥̫̔Ӱ̴̵̧̣̳̱̰̱̐̿Ӹ 7KH
prioritization of Russian ethnic and Orthodox religious supremacy within the empire
naturally led to the persecution of minorities, including the Jews.
Anti-Semitism in Russia was so strong, in fact, that even the cataclysm of the Russian
Revolution could only temporarily suppress their expression. Many secular Jews rose to
great prominence in Lenin’s party, including Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Leon
Trotsky. The anti-Semitism of the Lenin era was unique in that it was an unremarkable
part of a larger anti-religious, anti-national, universalist revolution.
%\WKHPLGGOHRI6WDOLQӵVUHLJQKRZHYHURFLDODQWL6HPLWLVPKDGFUHHSHGEDFNLQWRWKH
Soviet government.76 Notably, the particular ostracizing of Jews returned, along with
the requisite ideological tenets, singling out Jews as a particular threat per se worthy of
more attention and more opposition than other nationalities and religions.
The open propaganda against Jews jarred with Lenin’s heritage and
internationalism. For this reason, the Soviet authorities replaced the
73
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$DURQ/HYLQHӷ5XVVLDQ-HZVDQGWKH5HYROXWLRQӸPrimary Source 4, no. 2.
/HYLQHӷ5XVVLDQ-HZVӸ
$QWL'HIDPDWLRQ/HDJXHӷ$+RD[RI+DWH7KH3URWRFROVRIWKH/HDUQHG(OGHUVRI=LRQӸ
$'/RUJODVWPRGLHGDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
9ODGLPLU6KODSHQWRNKӷ3XWLQDVD)OH[LEOH3ROLWLFLDQ'RHV+H,PLWDWH6WDOLQ"ӸCommunist
and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008): 206.
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term Jews with ‘Zionists’. Since Zionism was a ‘legitimate’ enemy of
socialism, it became possible to carry out an anti-Semitic campaign
XQGHUWKHJXLVHRIWKHJKWDJDLQVWLW7KHKDWUHGRI-HZVZDVVRKLJK
that the Soviet propaganda tended to describe Zionism as a greater
evil than the United States, suggesting that American imperialism was
merely a tool used by the Jews to conquer the world.
The anti-Zionist campaigns, which started almost immediately after
WKH%ROVKHYLNYLFWRU\DQGLQWHQVLHGLQWKHPLGVZHUHFDUULHG
RXWXQWLOWKHQDOGD\VRIWKH8665ӿ77
Along with the renaissance of ideological anti-Semitism came the return of anti-Semitic
SROLFLHV HHFWLYHO\ EDUULQJ -HZV IURP WKH XSSHU OHYHOV RI JRYHUQPHQW LQ WKH 6RYLHW
Union and mandating anti-Jewish quotas in education.
6XFKSROLFLHVZRXOGFRQWLQXHWKURXJKWKHQH[WIRXUGHFDGHVRI6RYLHWKLVWRU\2FLDO
anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union became so engrained and institutionalized, in fact, that
LWDOWHUHGRUFRORUHGWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHWHUPLQDQWL6HPLWLVP5XVVLDQ ̵̴̵̨̣̰̫̯̫̫̪̯ 
Under the Soviet regime, anti-Semitism was a state-sponsored policy,
UHHFWHG LQ FDPSDLJQV LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQWFRQWUROOHG SUHVV DUUHVWV
of Jewish activists and Hebrew teachers, mass refusal of the right to
emigrate and discriminatory quotas on admission to higher education
and certain prestigious occupations.
The Russian word antisemitizm is therefore understood by many
Russian Jews to mean solely the state-sponsored anti-Semitism of the
past. When these same people describe anti-Semitic acts committed by
non-state actors, they more often than not precede it with the word
bytovoy (‘day to day’ or’ street-level’).78
Both the Imperial and Soviet history of Russia would tend to support continued antiSemitism sponsored, endorsed, and enforced by the Russian government, both because
of the preexistent ideological templates available to the Kremlin and because of sheer
LQHUWLD6XUSULVLQJO\RFLDODQWL6HPLWLVPLQ5XVVLDLVDWDPXOWLFHQWXU\ORZ
Putin’s relations toward both individual Jews and the Jewish people in Russia has been
remarkably warm. Individuals of Jewish background have been among Putin’s closest
advisors and allies during his years in power, including Roman Abramovich, Arkady
and Boris Rotenberg, Oleg Deripaska, Viktor Vekselberg, and Mikhail Fridman.79
77
78
79

42

Ibid, 208.
1LFNRODL%XWNHYLFKӷ7KH1HZ)DFHRI6WDWH6SRQVRUHG$QWL6HPLWLVPLQ5XVVLDӸEast
ɂȵȤȱǲǙȞ=ǲ͡ȈȸȅωǙȈȵȸ 32, no. 1 (June 2006): 138.
/XNH+DUGLQJӷ7KH5LFKHU7KH\&RPHӸThe Guardian,ODVWPRGLHG-XO\
accessed November 29, 2017.
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In particularly stark contrast to the anti-Semitic policies of the Soviet Union, euphemized
DVӷDQWL=LRQLVWӸWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWXQGHU3XWLQKDVPDLQWDLQHGUHPDUNDEO\FORVH
DQGFRRSHUDWLYHUHODWLRQVZLWK,VUDHOӷ'XULQJ3XWLQӵVSUHVLGHQF\,VUDHOKDVFRPHWR
SOD\DQLQFUHDVLQJO\VLJQLFDQWUROHLQ5XVVLDӵV0LGGOH(DVWSROLF\3XWLQKDVGRQHPRUH
WKDQDQ\RWKHU5XVVLDQOHDGHUWRLPSURYHHFRQRPLFDQGVWUDWHJLFWLHVZLWK,VUDHOӸ80 As
Ilya Bourtman points out, the areas of cooperation between the Putin government and
successive Israeli governments have mostly centered on counterterrorism and energy
infrastructure and trade.81 +LV DQDO\VLV SHUKDSV XQGHUVWDWHV WKH VLJQLFDQFH RI WKLV
FRRSHUDWLRQ%H\RQGPHUHӷSUDJPDWLVPF\QLFLVPDQGHFRQRPLFFDOFXODWLRQVӸHQHUJ\
exports and security – particularly against terrorists – are the cornerstones of Putin’s
legitimacy, such as it is. More than any other policies, energy and security determine the
fate and true intention of the Putin regime, and their close cooperation with Israel on
WKHVHPDWWHUVVXJJHVWVDVLQFHUHUHVSHFWDQGDQLW\WKDWZKLOHQRWXQOLPLWHGZRXOGEH
scandalous for any previous Russian ruler.
,Q'RPHVWLFDDLUVKLVRYHUWXUHVWR-HZVZLWKLQ5XVVLDKDYHEHHQQROHVVXQSUHFHGHQWHG
During his stay in the Kremlin, Putin met with rabbis several times. In
his last meeting with Russia’s chief rabbi in June 2007, he promised to
donate one month’s salary for the construction of a Jewish museum
of tolerance. Putin meets regularly with representatives from Russian
Jewish Communities and various Western Jewish organizations. In
October 2007, he met with a representative of the European Jewish
Congress, attended many Jewish religious celebrations (for instance,
Hanukkah in 2001) and regularly sent congratulations to the Russian
-HZVLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWK5RVK+D6KDQDKWKH-HZLVK1HZ<HDUDQG
Hanukkah. Speaking in Krakow on January 27, 2005, in connection
with the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, Putin urged
other nations to consider the lessons learned from the Holocaust and
warned against anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia worldwide.
What is more, he also noted the existence of anti-Semitism in Russia, a
statement that none of the Soviet leaders after Lenin dared to make...82
While the statements of the president are not always signs of durable and explicit policies
positions of the Russian government, it appears that Putin’s friendliness toward Jews is
HLWKHUEHLQJHQFRXUDJHGDPRQJRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWRFLDOVRULVYROXQWDULO\LPLWDWHGE\
WKHPVXJJHVWLQJDPRUHSHUPDQHQWDQGRFLDOVWDWXVRISUR6HPLWLF83 attitudes within
80
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,O\D%RXUWPDQӷ3XWLQDQG5XVVLDӵV0LGGOH(DVWHUQ3ROLF\ӸEȈǮǮȘǲǙȸȿ[ǲ͠Ȉǲ͡ȤǾ
2ȞȿǲȵȞǙȿȈȤȞǙȘωǙȈȵȸ 10, no. 2 (June 2006): 2.
Ibid, 2-4.
6KODSHQWRNKӷ3XWLQDVD)OH[LEOHӸ
7KHWHUPӷSUR6HPLWLFӸLVXVHGDGYLVHGO\DQGPHUHO\LQWHQGVWRGHQRWHWKHGLHUHQFHV
between the Putin government and its predecessors. It is only a relative distinction, and is
not meant to provide an absolute positive or negative evaluation of the government’s Jewish
policies.
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the government.
Putin continues to make positive gestures towards Russia’s Jewish
community by attending major Jewish events, praising the role of Jews
in Russia’s history and contemporary life, and strongly condemning
antisemitism. In many regions, it is no longer uncommon to see a
mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the community
RQ D KROLGD\ 7KHVH RFLDO JHVWXUHV KDYH KHOSHG WR FUHDWH D PRUH
FRQGHQWFOLPDWHIRU-HZVLQ5XVVLDVSXUULQJDFRQWLQXHGUHQDLVVDQFH
of Jewish life in Russia, as evidenced by the growing number of
synagogues being returned to the community after decades of
government ownership, the increasing media coverage of Jewish
communal activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic
and international events, and a rising willingness of Jewish leaders in
some parts of the country to stand up publicly for their rights.84
However cynical, the Russian government’s use of accusations of anti-Semitism to
slander its foes also suggests a consistent pro-Semitic self-perception. The annexation
of Crimea and proxy war in Donbas following the Euromaidan of 2014 have provided
VHYHUDO JRRG H[DPSOHV ӷ7KH UHYROXWLRQDU\ FKDQJH RI SRZHU LQ .LHY SURPSWHG WKH
Kremlin to view new Ukrainian values as incompatible with those of Russia and
Eurasia. In his press conference, Putin referred to the Ukrainian events as the ‘rampage
RI1D]LQDWLRQDOLVWDQGDQWL6HPLWLFIRUFHVӵӸ85 Referring to the Euromaidan protests,
KHFODLPHGWKDWӷ1DWLRQDOLVWVQHR1D]LV5XVVRSKREHVDQGDQWL6HPLWHVH[HFXWHGWKLV
FRXS7KH\FRQWLQXHWRVHWWKHWRQHLQ8NUDLQHWRWKLVGD\Ӹ86
Certainly, the Kremlin has also accused others of its own bad behavior, such as
interfering in the domestic politics of other countries. Ordinarily, accusations against
other countries by the Putin government bear little ontological weight. Indeed,
Kremlin endorsement is often a contrary indicator to verisimilitude. However, given
the context of the steady continuation of the Kremlin’s Jewish policies under Putin,
these statements might be viewed in another light – not as arch-cynical accusations,
EXWDVDZD\RIGHQLQJZKRPHYHULVFRQFHLYHGWREH5XVVLDӵVHQHP\DVWKHRSSRVLWH
RI5XVVLDQ,QWKH8NUDLQLDQFDVHGHQLQJDSUR:HVWHUQHQHP\DVSURJD\DQGDQWL
Semitic (at least relative to Russia) may contain a kernel of truth.87
84
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Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), Antisemitism, Xenophobia
and Religious Persecution in Russia’s Regions, 2001 (Moscow: UCSJ, 2002), 1-2.
$QGUHL37V\JDQNRYӷ9ODGLPLU3XWLQӵV/DVW6WDQG7KH6RXUFHVRI5XVVLDӵV8NUDLQH3ROLF\Ӹ
XȤȸȿण^Ȥ͠ȈǲȿωǙȈȵȸ31, no. 4 (February 4, 2015): 294.
9ODGLPLU3XWLQӷ$GGUHVVE\3UHVLGHQWRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQӸ3UHVLGHQWRI5XVVLDODVW
PRGLHG0DUFKDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
7RP%DOPIRUWKӷ$V8NUDLQH6D\VӴ)DUHZHOO8QZDVKHG5XVVLDӵ3XWLQ6D\V7DNH&DUHLQ
Ӵ*D\ӵ(XURSHӸ5)(5/ODVWPRGLHG-XQHDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
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In addition to historical precedent, Putin’s Jewish policies should also be evaluated in
WHUPVRIWKHLUSROLWLFDOEHQHWVDQGFRVWV,IXSRQDVVXPLQJWKHSUHVLGHQF\LQ DQG
in his own right in 2000), Putin had decided to adopt more historically congruous,
anti-Semitic policies and rhetoric, the costs would likely have been quite low. Clearly,
at least in terms of domestic politics, anti-Semitism did not appear to hurt the political
prospects or power of any of Putin’s predecessors.
Conversely, the all-but-unimpeachable conclusion that Putin holds an unbreakable
grip on supreme power in Russia suggests that he could adopt supremely unpopular
or otherwise risky positions without encountering a serious threat to his dominance.88
There are, of course, natural limits to Putin’s power, and his government has granted
concessions to opposition forces when it felt it was required. Protests against pension
reform in 2005, for instance, prompted the government to double the planned increase
in pension payments and reintroduce free public transportation.89 After the 2011-2012
Bolotnaya protests in opposition to the suspect 2011 Duma elections and the dubious
2012 reelection of Putin, the Duma amended the constitution to restore local election
of regional governors as a democratic compromise.90 But neither of these concessions
VHULRXVO\ WKUHDWHQHG KLV FRQWURO ,QGHHG PDQ\ JRYHUQRUV KDYH EHHQ HHFWLYHO\ UHG
in 2017 as the Kremlin has announced its acceptance of resignations they never sent.
Others have resigned at the behest of the Kremlin.91 In other words, the pro-Semitic
policies of Putin’s Kremlin cannot be described as political necessities. Putin can, in the
long run, adopt any policies he wants – even to the extent that he can de facto change
WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGUXOHIURPWKHSULPHPLQLVWHUӵVRFH92
Moreover, anti-Semitism could have been a powerful political weapon for the Kremlin.
The issue might have been used as a way to drive a wedge through the opposition, much
OLNHWKHODZӷIRUWKH3XUSRVHRI3URWHFWLQJ&KLOGUHQIURP,QIRUPDWLRQ$GYRFDWLQJ
IRUD'HQLDORI7UDGLWLRQDO)DPLO\9DOXHVӸ ӷ̸̵̵̵̷̨̧̨̨̥̹̮̪̣̼̫̬̱̫̰̱̳̯̣̹̫̫͂̾
̶̧̨̲̳̱̲̣̦̣̰̫̳̼̬́ ̵̨̱̳̫̹̣̰̫ ̵̸̧̳̣̫̹̫̱̰̰̾ ̴̸̨̨̯̬̰̾ ̴̵̨̨̹̰̰̱̬Ӹ  DQG RWKHU
measures after the Bolotnaya protests:
First, the Kremlin sensationalised the minor, allegedly sacrilegious
performance of the Russian punk band Pussy Riot in Moscow’s
Cathedral of Christ the Saviour to bring division into the opposition
movement on religious grounds. Second, Russia adopted the so-called
'LPD<DNRYOHY/DZWKDWEDQQHG86FLWL]HQVIURPDGRSWLQJ5XVVLDQ
88
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Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Change (Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 2.
&ODLUH%LJJӷ3URWHVWVDFURVV5XVVLD)RUFH3XWLQWR'RXEOH,QFUHDVHLQ3HQVLRQ3D\PHQWVӸ
The Guardian, January 18, 2005, accessed November 29, 2017.
Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia, 120.
5DGLR)UHH(XURSH5DGLR/LEHUW\ӷ.DUHOLD*RYHUQRU,V)LIWKWR5HVLJQLQ5XVVLDLQ5HFHQW
'D\VӸ)5(5/ODVWPRGLHG)HEUXDU\DFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia, 41.
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orphan children in order to divide the opposition on the grounds of
Russian nationalism intrinsically characterised by anti-Americanism.
7KLUGLWDGRSWHGWKHDQWL/*%7SURSDJDQGDODZRFLDOO\WRSURWHFW
children from ‘information advocating for a denial of traditional
family values’, but essentially to splinter the opposition movement
exploiting the divisive LGBT issue.93
Lately, much attention in the academic literature and beyond has focused on the Putin
regime’s relationship with far-right nationalist forces, both within Russia and in the
:HVW7KHLQXHQFHRIWKLQNHUVDQGWKHRULVWVVXFKDV$OHNVDQGU'XJLQDQG,YDQ,O\LQ
and has been brought to light and debated. (There are other suspected intellectual
forbearers of the current Kremlin as well; the four listed here will be discussed further
LQ WKLV SDSHU  *HQHUDOO\ RQH ZRXOG H[SHFW WR QG DQWL6HPLWLVP IROORZV ZKHUHYHU
nationalism goes. In Russia, no less, where the stage seems perfectly set for revanchist
QDWLRQDOLVP LW LV SDUWLFXODUO\ VWUDQJH WR QG SUR6HPLWLVP PL[HG ZLWK 5XVVLDQ
nationalism and/or Eurasianism.
Although, as detailed above, many of Putin’s policies are unusually friendly towards
Jews, it is necessary to point out that Putin’s Kremlin has also adopted policies and
postures that can be interpreted as anti-Semitic themselves, give aid and comfort to antiSemites, or both.
Unlike Western leaders, he did not openly stand up against the
two greatest anti-Semites of our timed the Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the Iranian President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad. In October 2003, Putin attended the meeting of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, during which Mahathir
Mohamad talked about the Jews who ruled the world. As Putin’s
VHPLRFLDOELRJUDSKHU.ROHVQLNRYZURWHLQKLVERRN3XWLQ6DZ0H
the Russian President said nothing about this rude anti-Semitic tirade,
even though he had the opportunity to do so, because he addressed the
conference following the Malaysian leader. While chatting with the
Russian journalists who attended the conference, Putin did mention
that some speeches at the conference were ‘extremist’. What is more,
Putin never made critical comments about the appeal of the current
[2008] president of Iran to obliterate Israel.94
He has also hosted meetings with groups such as Hamas, which are openly anti-Semitic
in ways most similar to Ahmadinejad. On a lesser count, Putin’s government has been
UPLQRSSRVLWLRQWRUHWXUQLQJWKHOLEUDU\RIWKH/XEDYLFKHU5HEEH0HQDFKHP

93
94

Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, Fascism & The Far Right
6HULHV 1HZ<RUN5RXWOHGJH 
6KODSHQWRNKӷ3XWLQDVD)OH[LEOHӸ
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Schneerson.95 Nonetheless, these policies, consequential as they may be, are deviations
from the pro-Semitic norm of the 21st-century Kremlin.
There are several explanations that may account for why Putin’s government has
pursued such consistent pro-Semitic policies, including the nationalist ideological tenets
of his regime (such as they may be), the Putin government’s pragmatic use of political
ideas as propaganda, foreign policy considerations, and Putin’s personal biography.

The ideology hypothesis
The support that Putin’s government has given to far-right elements inside and outside
Russia would also suggest, prima facie, that the regime would support anti-Semitism.
After all, in the West, far-right ideas and groups are ubiquitously anti-Semitic (in
DGGLWLRQWRDKRVWRIRWKHUELJRWULHV 8SRQUVWJODQFHLWVHHPVWRIROORZQDWXUDOO\WKDW
far-right ideologues in Russia would be anti-Semitic as well: They live in a country with
a tradition of popular anti-Semitism at least as long and deep as those of other European
countries, and they endorse ideas commonly associated with anti-Semitism, including
ethnic or national supremacy.
7KRVHZKREHOLHYHWKDWWKH3XWLQUHJLPHLVLQXHQFHGE\IDUULJKWLGHDVZKHWKHUEHFDXVH
Putin himself endorses them or because other senior members of the government do,
KDYHVHYHUDOH[DPSOHVRISDUWLFXODUDQGLQXHQWLDOQDWLRQDOLVWDQGRU(XUDVLDQLVWWKHRULVWV
who did not subscribe to anti-Semitism as evidence to support their claim. While it is
possible that some in the highest positions in the government, including Putin himself,
subscribe to Eurasianist and similar ideas, the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Eurasianist
ideology is still too great to adequately explain the Putin government’s Jewish policies.
Aleksandr Dugin
The most prominent face of current Russian far-right thought is Aleksandr Dugin, an
DXWRGLGDFWSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHUDQGFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULVWZLWKWLHVWRVRPHLQXHQWLDO
.UHPOLQ JXUHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH $FDGHP\ RI WKH *HQHUDO 6WD RI WKH 5XVVLDQ $UP\
,QVKRUWKHYLHZVWKHLUUHSUHVVLEOHWLGHRIZRUOGKLVWRU\DVDFRQLFWEHWZHHQӷZDWHU
SRZHUVӸӰVWDWHVWKDWJURZXSDURXQGFRDVWOLQHVGHYHORSQDYDODQGPHUFKDQWFXOWXUHV
and economies, free markets, pluralism, and secularism – and land powers, which grow
up on the great Eurasian land mass, especially the enormous steppe running from
Eastern Europe to western China, independent of coasts, and develop strong land
armies, autocracy, omnipotent states, and conservative, spiritual cultures.96
Dugin’s conception of Russia is as a dominant cultural and political actor in a larger,
united civilization: Eurasia. Eurasia includes, coincidentally, all the former possessions
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$YLWDO&KL]KLNӷ3XWLQ5HIXVHVWR/HWWKH/XEDYLWFKHU5HEEHӵV/LEUDU\/HDYH0RVFRZӸ
7DEOHWODVWPRGLHG6HSWHPEHUDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
Charles Clover, ȘǙǨȖvȈȞǮ࣓vȅȈȿǲ^ȞȤ͡eȅǲ[ȈȸǲȤǾ[ɂȸȸȈǙहȸFǲ͡FǙȿȈȤȞǙȘȈȸȝ (New Haven,
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of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, including the Central and Eastern Europe,
the Balkans, Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Russian Far East, plus
perhaps more. This massive territory, currently comprised of dozens of countries, he
LGHQWLHVDVWKH(XUDVLDQ+HDUWODQG
To the extent that Jews enter into Dugin’s thinking at all, they play only a very small
role. As a rule of thumb, this suggests he is not an anti-Semite.97 Since Jews have lived for
centuries in countries and among civilizations belonging to both of Dugin’s categories,
they do not belong more on either side of Dugin’s ledger. They are neither inherent
enemies nor inherent allies of Russian Eurasia. In some ways, the epistemological
certainty of Dugin’s geographical determinism precludes him from sharing the KGBstyle anti-Semitism seen in Putin’s regime. According to Albats,
.*%SHRSOHEHOLHYHLQWKH:RUOG-HZLVK&RQVSLUDF\ӿ7KH\GREHOLHYH
that the world is run by Jews, that there is some world government, that
there is some conspiratorial money or body. There were several cases
ZKHQ WKHVH JX\V ZHUH DSSURDFKLQJ PH DQG VD\LQJ ӷ:H XQGHUVWDQG
\RXKDYHDJUHDWFRQQHFWLRQVWRWKH:RUOG-HZLVK&RQJUHVVӸDQG,ZDV
WKLQNLQJӷ:DLWDVHFRQG\RXJX\VGRQӵWNQRZZKDW\RXӵUHWDONLQJ
DERXWӸ98
Conspiracy theories are such a common marker of anti-Semitism that they are almost
SDUW RI WKH YHU\ GHQLWLRQ 7KH 86 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQWӵV ZHESDJH ӷ'HQLQJ $QWL
6HPLWLVPӸLQFOXGHVӷ0DNLQJPHQGDFLRXVGHKXPDQL]LQJGHPRQL]LQJRUVWHUHRW\SLFDO
DOOHJDWLRQVDERXW-HZVDVVXFKRUWKHSRZHURI-HZVDVDFROOHFWLYHӱHVSHFLDOO\EXWQRW
exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media,
HFRQRP\ JRYHUQPHQW RU RWKHU VRFLHWDO LQVWLWXWLRQVӸ99 By contrast, Dugin’s premise
that geography is the controlling force of history precludes belief in secret global
FRQVSLUDFLHV:KLOHQRWGLVSRVLWLYHWKLVVXJJHVWVWKDW'XJLQӵVLQXHQFHLVQDWLRQDOLVWLF
DQGLPSHULDOLVWLFEXWQRWVSHFLFDOO\DQWL6HPLWLF
7KH PRVW HDVLO\ DFFHVVLEOH VWDWHPHQWV RI 'XJLQ UHJDUGLQJ -HZV DUH IURP D <RX7XEH
interview recorded March 6, 2016.100 ,Q WKDW LQWHUYLHZ 'XJLQ GLHUHQWLDWHV LQ WZR
ZD\VEHWZHHQWKH6WDWHRI,VUDHODQG-HZV)LUVWWKHUHLVDӷQDWXUDOV\PSDWK\ӸIRU,VUDHOL
Jews among Russians, given the large numbers of Russian-speaking Israeli Jews. This
is questionable as it pertains to popular opinion, though more than likely this does
DFFXUDWHO\UHSUHVHQWWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWӷ%HLQJDQWL:HVWDQWL
97
98
99
100
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7KHUHLVDMRNHZKLFKVD\Vӷ7KHUHDUHWZRW\SHVRISHRSOHZKRDUHREVHVVHGZLWK-HZV-HZV
DQGDQWL6HPLWHVӸ7KHUHLVVRPHZLVGRPLQWKLV
,QWHUYLHZZLWK<HYJHQLD$OEDWV
ӷ'HQLQJ$QWL6HPLWLVPӸ86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHODVWPRGLHG-DQXDU\
accessed December 14, 2017.
ӷ'XJLQRQ,VODPRSKRELD,VUDHO+H]EROODK$&DOLSKDWHӸYLGHROH<RX7XEHSRVWHG
by 108morris108, March 5, 2016, accessed November 29, 2017.
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1$72ZHDUHQRWDJDLQVW,VUDHOE\SULQFLSOHӸ101 In other words, there is not innate
(geopolitical) reason for Russians and Jews, as manifested by their national states, to be
HQHPLHV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGӷZKHQZHDUHSROLWHWRWKH,VUDHOLVWKDWGRHVQӵWPHDQZH
DUHJRLQJWREHWUD\+H]EROODKӿ:HKDYHYHU\JRRGUHODWLRQVZLWK,VUDHODQGZHGRQӵW
want to make these relations worse, but at the same time, [we are] with Hezbollah now
DVVWUDWHJLFDO>VLF@DOOLHV,WӵVYHU\LPSRUWDQWӸ102 Short-term strategy, he seems to imply,
compels Russia to support forces bent on Israel’s destruction. Taken together, these
statements seem to suggest that geopolitical, long-term relations between Russians
and Jews as nations will not always match short-term relations between Moscow and
Jerusalem.
Second, within Israel – or, perhaps, within the whole of world Jewry – Russia and the
8QLWHG6WDWHVDUHERXQGWRVXSSRUWGLHUHQWLQWHUHVWV
:H KDYH FRPSOHWHO\ GLHUHQW JRDOV )RU H[DPSOH LI ZH >WKH 8QLWHV
States and Russia] support two countries or two movements, always,
DOZD\V E\ >VLF@ JHRSROLWLFDO UHDVRQV ZH DUH VXSSRUWLQJ GLHUHQW
SROHVӿ )RU H[DPSOH ZH >5XVVLD@ DUH VXSSRUWLQJ RQH WHQGHQF\ LQ
,VUDHO $PHULFDQ Ӱ FRPSOHWHO\ RWKHUӿ:H KDYH JRRG UHODWLRQV ZLWK
Israel; the United States has good relations with Israel; but there are
two Israels. There is the geopolitically Atlanticist sea power Israel,
represented by Israeli oligarchy, Israeli racism, [the] pro-American,
pro-Western core of Israeli society. But there is Israeli traditions [sic],
WKH\DUHGLHUHQW103
This is the closest statement Dugin makes to anti-Semitism. While he does portray
Jews and the evolution of Jewish religion and culture – a process 5000 years in the
PDNLQJӰDVFRPSOHWHO\VXEMHFWWRWKHLQXHQFHVRIPDMRURXWVLGHSRZHUV DQGSHUKDSV
teleologically dependent on them as well), he applies this same logic to all peoples,
traditions, and histories.
He may easily be called a Russian supremacist and would probably agree that he is a
nationalist, but he is not necessarily an anti-Semite because he does not reserve for Jews
special fear, hatred, or discrimination. If the Kremlin – or at least one part of it – is truly
are enamored of Dugin’s theories, it is possible that they could share his imperialist
Russian supremacism without anti-Semitism. The problem, however, is how they
FRXOGVRHDVLO\DFFHSW'XJLQZKLOHUHMHFWLQJKLVLQXHQFHVDQGLQWHOOHFWXDODQFHVWRUV
Ivan Ilyin
Ivan Ilyin is one of the clearest examples of a Eurasianist anti-Semite. After the Bolshevik
UHYROXWLRQKHZDVH[LOHGIURPWKHFRXQWU\DVDӷ:KLWHSKLORVRSKHUӸZKRGLVIDYRUHG
101
102
103
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Lenin’s revolution – that much was true – and was therefore undesirable. He then
taught in Germany, where he was active in the community of exiled, anti-Bolshevik,
Russian intellectuals. As an alternative to Bolshevism, he embraced Eurasianism for its
spiritual and quasi-religious dimension which Bolshevism lacked.
For similar reasons, he was a great fan of Mussolini, who he saw as successful in uniting
Italians in a deeply historic and spiritually authentic rite of patriotism. When Hitler
rose to power in Germany, Ilyin supported him as well (even at one point working for
Joseph Goebbels), simultaneously condemning German Jews for opposing him, which
he ascribed to uniform support among Jews for Bolshevim.104
,O\LQ DUJXH>G@ WKDW WKH 5XVVLDQ VWDWHӱE\ ZKLFK KH PHDQW WKH ROG
5XVVLDQ(PSLUHDQGLWVJHRJUDSKLFGHVFHQGDQWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQӱ
is a unique geo-historical entity tied together by the spiritual unity
of the Euro-Asiatic nations. In his view, Hitler’s National Socialism,
Mussolini’s fascism, and the Russian White movement were very
VLPLODU DQG ӷVSLULWXDOO\ FORVHӸ +H GHVFULEHG WKHP DV VKDULQJ D
ӷFRPPRQDQGXQLWHGHQHP\SDWULRWLVPVHQVHRIKRQRUYROXQWDU\
VDFULFLDO VHUYLFH DQ DWWUDFWLRQ WR GLFWDWRULDO GLVFLSOLQH WR VSLULWXDO
renewal and the revival/rebirth of their country, and the search for
DQHZVRFLDOMXVWLFHӸ$QRSSRQHQWRIERWK6RYLHWFRPPXQLVPDQG
:HVWHUQGHPRFUDF\,O\LQHQYLVLRQHGDӷVSHFLDOӸSDWKIRU5XVVLDEDVHG
on the promotion of the Orthodox Church and traditional values that
would bring about a spiritual renewal of the Russian people, who at
WKHPRPHQWKHEHOLHYHGZHUHXQGHUWKHLQXHQFHRI:HVWHUQSROLWLFDO
and social constructs.105
Clearly, Ilyin’s passion for fascism has not been inherited by the modern Russian
SROLWLFDO FODVV $OWKRXJK VRPH JXUHV PDUJLQDOO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH FXUUHQW UHJLPH
have made use of fascist and Nazi iconography and symbolism, the ideas of fascism and
1D]LVPVSHFLFDOO\DUHXWWHUO\ODFNLQJIURPWKH.UHPOLQ106 The lengths to which the
FXUUHQWSRZHUVJRWRGHQHWKHLURSSRQHQWVDVIDVFLVWVDQG1D]LVӰHVSHFLDOO\WRWKH
domestic population – suggests the enduing enmity and disgust with which fascism
and Nazism are regarded. Similarly, despite Ilyin’s own Wagnerian anti-Semitism, the
intellectual legacy of his theory contributes only indirectly to modern anti-Semitism.
,O\LQ LQWURGXFHG LQWR WKH 5XVVLDQ SROLWLFDO YRFDEXODU\ WKH WHUP ӷZRUOG EDFNVWDJHӸ
ӷ̯̫̳̱̥̣͂ ̶̴̪̣̭̮̫̣Ӹ  E\ ZKLFK KH PHDQW VRPH VHFUHW :HVWHUQGRPLQDWHG
FRQVSLUDWRULDOFDEDOVHFUHWO\SXOOLQJWKHVWULQJVRIZRUOGDDLUV:KLOHKHQHYHUH[SOLFLWO\
104
105
106
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connected the idea with Jews per se, the well-known conspiracy theory of the secret
ZRUOGRUGHURIWHQLQFOXGHV-HZVDVLWVPDVWHUPLQGVӷ,QWKHEURDGHUVHQVHWKLVWHUP
LPSOLHVWKDWWKHRFLDOO\HOHFWHGOHDGHUVRIWKH:HVWDUHLQIDFWSXSSHWVRIWKHZRUOGӵV
true rulers: businessmen, Masonic agents, and, often, Jews. These days, that phrase
VHHPVRPQLSUHVHQWLQ5XVVLDQGLVFRXUVHDQGVWDWHFRQWUROOHGPHGLDӸ
However, the concept is not original to Ilyin. Its occurrence in modern Russian
discourse cannot be directly traced to him. Indeed, as Albats indicated, conspiracy
theories in Russia, including or especially among the political elite, are so common
in part because in Russia they are sometimes true.107 Both the Bolshevik Revolution
and the August Putsch that ended the Soviet Union were the results of conspiracies,
planned and carried out by a handful of powerful but little-known men in secret to
wrest control of government forcefully away from another leader. Every leader of the
Soviet Union in between was selected through a process – not of open competition,
debate, and popular selection – but of back-room dealing and secret maneuvers at the
YHU\KHLJKWVRISRZHU+DG,O\LQQRWLQWURGXFHGWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHӷZRUOGEDFNVWDJHӸ
someone would have needed to invent it just to write the Russian news.
Ilyin is considered to be a particular favorite philosopher of Putin’s: He assigned the
UHJLRQDO JRYHUQRUV RI 5XVVLD WR UHDG 2XU 7DVNV ̣̻̫̐ ̧̣̣̺̫̊ DOVR WUDQVODWHG 2XU
Mission) over the 2014 winter break.108 It is easy to explain why Putin might revere
Ilyin’s work yet not share his anti-Semitism. Ilyin primarily hated Jews because of their
connection to – and, he believed, universal support for – Bolshevism. For the former
KGB agent who clearly views the U.S.S.R. with nostalgia, this support may be a virtue
where for Ilyin it was a vice.
3XWLQKDVDGRSWHGDUHODWHGGHQLWLRQRIVHOIDQGHQHP\LQKLVUKHWRULFDQGKHGHSLFWV
KLVUROHDVUHLQYLJRUDWLQJWKH5XVVLDQVWDWHDQGE\H[WHQVLRQLWVFXOWRISDWULRWLVPӷ0\
sacred duty is to bring together the Russian people, unite the people around clear tasks.
:HKDYHRQHIDWKHUODQGRQHSHRSOHDQGDFRPPRQIXWXUHӸ109 That fatherland has, in
some of Putin’s explanations, a distinctly Eurasianist character, consisting of not just a
nation state but a collection of nations united in one overarching civilization, led and
dominated by (ethnic) Russians:
The rod that fastens the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian
people, Russian culture. Our opponents and all kinds of provocateurs
will try will all their might to wrest this rod from Russia – through
false conversations about the right of Russians to self-determination,
DERXWӷUDFLDOSXULW\ӸDERXWWKHQHFHVVLW\ӷWRQLVKWKHEXVLQHVVRI
DQGQDOO\GHVWUR\WKHHPSLUHVVHDWHGRQWKHQHFN
107
108
109

,QWHUYLHZZLWK<HYJHQLD$OEDWV
%DUEDVKLQDQG7KREXUQӷ3XWLQӵV3KLORVRSKHUӸ+XGVRQ,QVWLWXWH
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RI WKH 5XVVLDQ SHRSOHӸ 8OWLPDWHO\ WR IRUFH WKH SHRSOH WR GHVWUR\
their own Fatherland with their very hands.
̵̨̨̳̩̰̔̿ ̴̨̭̳̲̮̼̣͂́͂ ̵̭̣̰̿ ̵̱̬̀ ̶̰̫̭̣̮̰̱̬̿ ̹̫̥̫̮̫̪̣̹̫̫
Ӱ ̶̴̴̳̭̫̬ ̧̰̣̳̱ ̶̴̴̳̭̣͂ ̶̵̶̭̮̳̣̿ ̵̱̅ ̭̣̭ ̳̣̪ ̵̵̱̀ ̴̵̨̨̳̩̰̿
̵̵̴̴̶̶̵̧̨̧̳̣̪̰̱̦̱̳̱̣̲̳̱̥̱̭̣̱̳̫̰̣̻̫̲̳̱̫̥̰̫̭̫̥̯̫̫̮̣̯̫̤̾
̵̵̴̵̴̴̲̣̥̳̥̣̫̪̱̫̫̾̿͂̾̿̓Ӱ̴̷̧̨̲̱̰̣̭̥̱̪̣̮̻̫̥̳̣̪̦̱̥̱̳̿̿̾̾
̱ ̨̲̳̣̥ ̶̴̴̸̳̭̫ ̰̣ ̴̨̧̨̨̨̣̯̱̱̲̳̮̰̫ ̱ m̴̳̣̱̥̱̬ ̴̵̵̨̺̫̱}
̱ ̸̴̵̨̧̰̱̤̱̫̯̱̫ m̵̨̪̣̥̳̻̫̿ ̧̨̮̱  ̧̦̱̣ ̫ ̵̨̱̭̱̰̺̣̮̰̱̿
̶̵̴̶̶̶̴̴̨̧̨̨̧̳̣̪̳̻̫̫̯̲̳̫̫̼̰̣̻̳̭̱̦̱̰̣̳̱̣̿́͂́}̵̱̤̾̚
̥ ̨̭̱̰̺̰̱̯ ̴̵̨̨̺ Ӱ ̴̵̵̪̣̣̥̫̿ ̧̨̮̬́ ̴̥̱̫̯̫ ̶̳̭̣̯̫ ̶̵̵̰̫̺̱̩̣̿
̴̴̵̶̶̨̧̱̤̥̰̰̱̫̰́̓ 110
The Jews, to the extent that they facilitate the spread of European institutions (especially
economic ones), are targets of ideological attack by Eurasianists, but unlike their
position of evil primacy in the ideologies Nazi Germany or Western neo-Nazis, white
supremacists, and skinheads, they are not the prime enemy of Russian civilization. They
couldn’t be the prime enemy, because they don’t pose a serious threat. The Jews can’t
break up the empire. The Jews can’t rob Russia of its culture. The Jews can’t preach
about racial purity. They’re only a civilizational, existential threat as the agents of
the real enemy: Western, and especially American, global hegemony. Notably, this is
directly contradictory to the Soviet-era conception that the West was controlled by a
secretive cabal of Jews.
8OWLPDWHO\ WKH LQXHQFH RI QDWLRQDOLVW DQG (XUDVLDQLVW WKLQNLQJ RQ WKH .UHPOLQ LV
KHOSIXO EXW QRW VXFLHQW LQ H[SODLQLQJ WKH .UHPOLQӵV -HZLVK SROLFLHV 7KH .UHPOLQ
including Putin himself, appear very supportive of Eurasianist and national-imperialist
projects. Danilevsky’s theory of unique developmental paths, which certainly had
LQXHQFHRQODWHUWKHRULVWVDQGDSSHDUVWRKDYHVRPHSXOORQWKH.UHPOLQLWVHOIGRHV
not require denigration or animosity toward other historico-cultural types. Ilyin’s antiSemitism can be excised from his larger theories as a coincidence of his time and place –
the struggle over Bolshevism is long over. Moreover, Ilyin’s anti-Semitism is inseparable
from his primary critique of Bolshevism, which is its total lack of spirituality. This is a
critique that the Putin regime appears to share in some part, as evidenced by its close
association with the Russian Orthodox Church. It is also possible for the Kremlin (or
some of its elements) to embrace Dugin’s ideology and maintain pro-Semitic Jewish
policies, as the two are mutually compatible. All of these apparent paradoxes are
resolvable – though some more comfortably than others.
7KH DUJXPHQW WKDW (XUDVLDQLVW LGHRORJ\ LV LQXHQWLDO LQ WKH .UHPOLQ DQG WKDW LW
allows room for such policies, does not adequately explain the Putin regime’s policies.
Another explanation is required as to why the Putin government would want to avoid
110
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DQWL6HPLWLVP LQ WKH UVW SODFH 7KH UHJLPHӵV -HZLVK SROLFLHV VXJJHVW WKDW LW LV QRW DV
ideological as is sometimes believed.

The “syringe” hypothesis
There is considerable debate about the role of ideology, especially Eurasianist ideology,
LQ3XWLQӵVUHJLPH&KDUOHV&ORYHUKDVZULWWHQH[WHQVLYHO\RQWKHLQXHQFHRI(XUDVLDQLVW
philosophers on the Kremlin in Black Wind, White Snow, and gives ample evidence
to suggest that many in the highest echelons of power – though not necessarily Putin
himself – endorse Eurasianist ideas. Alternatively, Anton Shekhovtsov suggests in Russia
and the Western Far Right that the Putin regime’s only ideology is self-preservation:
ӷ,W RQO\ V\ULQJHV YHU\ VSHFLF LGHDV LQWR WKH ERG\ RI WKH 5XVVLDQ VRFLHW\ LQ RUGHU WR
achieve particular purposes. This is a typical mode of operation for authoritarian,
not totalitarian, states that occasionally, rather than permanently, engage in political
PRELOLVDWLRQRIWKHVRFLHW\Ӹ111
The possibility remains that Putin personally endorses Eurasianist ideas, that his quotes
RI,O\LQUHHFWKLVWUXHWKLQNLQJWKDWKHHQGRUVHVWKHLURYHUDOOZRUOGYLHZZLWKRXWDOVR
DGRSWLQJ DQWL6HPLWLVP %XW LWӵV DOVR SRVVLEOH WKDW VR PXFK VRXQG DQG IXU\ VLJQLHV
QRWKLQJ 7R ERUURZ 6KHNKRYWVRYӵV WHUP WKH .UHPOLQӵV XVH RI ӷLGHRORJLFDO V\ULQJHVӸ
allows for other explanations of its simultaneous far-right sympathies and pro-Semitism.
7KH ӷV\ULQJHӸ K\SRWKHVLV VXJJHVWV WKDW DQ\ LGHD RU LGHRORJ\ WKDW WKH .UHPOLQ QG
useful can be injected into the political discourse thanks to the almost total domination
of mass media and political speech by state-controlled outlets. If the ideas of long-dead
and forgotten minor philosopher like Ilyin could be resurrected, the theory would
hold, so then could one of the most successful prejudices in Russian history. This may
not be the case.
7KHUVWUHDVRQDQWL6HPLWLVPPD\EHRIOLWWOHXVHWRWKH.UHPOLQLVWKDWGHVSLWHWKH
GHHS KLVWRULFDO SUHFHGHQW RI RFLDO DQWL6HPLWLVP LQ 5XVVLD PRGHUQ SRSXODU RU
ӷVWUHHWӸ DQWL6HPLWLVP LV QRW HDVLO\ FRQQHFWHG WR SROLWLFV *LEVRQ DQG +RZDUG QG
WKDWӷDQWL-HZLVKSUHMXGLFHUHHFWVSHUVRQDOLW\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDVGRJPDWLVPDQG
[HQRSKRELD DQG LV HVVHQWLDOO\ LPSHUYLRXV WR LQXHQFH IURP SHUFHSWLRQV RI H[WHUQDO
HFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOVWUHVVӸ112
7KH\SURSRVHDQXPEHURIH[SODQDWLRQVZKLFKVXJJHVWWKDWDQWL6HPLWLVPLVDQXQW
tool for political mobilization.
At least one part of the answer is that not enough Russians are
predisposed to believe scurrilous allegations against Jews. Like the
‘race card’ in American politics, if racist predispositions are not
111
112

Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western, 80.
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VXFLHQWO\ZLGHVSUHDGWKHQWKHOLPLWHGUHVSRQVHWRSURHUVRIUDFLVW
DSSHDOV JHQHUDWHV IHZ SROLWLFDO EHQHWV 7KXV LQ VRPH VHQVH RXU
understanding of this problem does indeed rely upon the conclusion
that anti-Semitism in Russia is not widespread enough to be mobilized
successfully in electoral politics.113
$QRWKHUSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQLVWKDW-HZVDUHQRWRIVXFLHQWVDOLHQFHLQ5XVVLDWREH
easily scapegoated.114 This is likely related to the steep decline in the Jewish population
RI 5XVVLD VLQFH WKH PLGWK FHQWXU\ $W WKH WLPH RI WKH UVW $OO8QLRQ 3RSXODWLRQ
Census in 1926, there were about 567,000 Jews in the Russian Socialist Republic (out
of a total of nearly 2.6 million in the Soviet Union).115 The number of Jews in Russia
had declined only slightly by 1989, to about 537,00.116 By 2010, that number declined to
230,000 en route to an estimated 110,000 by 2050.117 The fall of the Soviet Union makes
the comparison even stronger. A Muscovite comparing the population of Jews in his
country (the U.S.S.R. before 1991 and the Russian Federation thereafter) between 1926
and 2010 would have seen a 91 percent drop. In other words, there are fewer than one
tenth the Jews in the relevant political entity to exploit for political gain.
Contemporary Russia also appears to be less strongly anti-Semitic than it has been in
WKHSDVWDQGWKDWLWLVZLGHO\DVVXPHGVWLOOWREH*LEVRQDQG+RZDUGQGWKDW
some research based on multiple indicators has discovered that antiSemitism seemed to be neither widespread nor virulent. For instance,
Gibson and Duch conclude that expressed anti-Semitism among
residents of the Moscow oblast ‘is more uncommon in Moscow [in
@>VLF@WKDQPDQ\ LQFOXGLQJXV KDGVXVSHFWHGӵ7KHLUQGLQJV
from a comparable survey in 1990 in the European portion of the
former Soviet Union support the same conclusion. Moreover, based
on his analysis of a survey of Russians conducted in 1992, Furman
writes: ‘Thus, no mass anti-Semitism was revealed by the survey (our
data agree in this regard with the data of other, analogous surveys),
DQGD-HZLVKSRJURPVHHPVOHVVOLNHO\WKDQVRPHVRUWRIӷ&DXFDVLDQӸ
pogrom.’118
113
114
115

118

Ibid. 217.
Ibid. 207.
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[Institute of Demography of the National Research University Higher School of Economics],
̴̨̯̱̭̱̲̇:HHNO\ODVWPRGLHG'HFHPEHUDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
Ibid.
ӷ3URMHFWHG&KDQJHLQWKH*OREDO-HZLVK3RSXODWLRQӸ3HZ5HVHDUFK&HQWHUODVWPRGLHG
April 2, 2015, accessed November 30, 2017.
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While Shlapentokh does not go so far, and still considers Russia’s levels of popular anti6HPLWLVPDODUPLQJKHQGVFRUURERUDWLQJWKDWHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH\PD\EHORZHUWKDQLV
often thought:
Anti-Semitism in Russia today [2008] is lower than it has been in
the last seven decades. Jews in Russia are much less inclined to hide
their ethnic origin or their interest in Jewish culture and religion.
According to data cited in Ryvkina’s comprehensive book, How
Jews Live in Russia , the proportion of Jews who talked about their
involvement in Jewish culture (considered a taboo in Soviet times)
increased by three times in 2004 in comparison with 1995. In the same
period, the number of Jews who declared themselves as believers in
Judaism increased by 50 percent, while the number of regular visitors
to synagogue increased by 11 times and the number of members of
Jewish organizations increased by almost 5 times. The number of
-HZVZKRVXHUHGIURPDQWL6HPLWLVPGHFOLQHGIURPSHUFHQWWR
percent.119
More recent data from the Levada Center paints a similar picture – that anti-Semitism
is relatively high compared to other European countries (and, of course, compared to
the ideal level, which is none) but relatively low compared to historical standards and
Weimar comparisons.
&XUUHQWO\RQO\RI5XVVLDQVDUHQHJDWLYHDERXW-HZVEXWH[SHUWV
point out several levels of anti-Semitic aggression: a stable core of
DQWL6HPLWLVP DQG [HQRSKRELD  RI UHVSRQGHQWV  WKRVH ZKR
VXSSRUW DQWL6HPLWLF DQG [HQRSKRELF FOLFK«V   WKRVH ZKR
believe that ethnic Russians should have advantages over others or
WKDWWKHSUHVLGHQWVKRXOGEH5XVVLDQ  $WWKHVDPHWLPHDQWL
Semitism is very marginalized and is concentrated on the periphery
of civil and social life, and anti-Semitic stereotypes and clichés have
VLJQLFDQWO\ ZHDNHQHG EXW GR QRW OHDYH PDVV FRQVFLRXVQHVV WKH
report says.
̴̨̬̺̣̔ ̭ ̨̨̥̳̯͂ ̵̴̵̴̱̰̱͂͂ ̵̨̰̦̣̫̥̰̱ ̮̫̻̿  ̴̴̳̱̫̰͂ ̰̱
̴̵̨̭̲̳̀̾ ̵̧̨̥̮̾͂́ ̴̨̰̭̱̮̭̱̿ ̶̨̳̱̥̰̬ ̵̴̵̴̨̣̰̫̯̫̭̱̬ ̴̴̨̣̦̳̫̫
̶̴̵̵̴̵̴̷̨̧̨̨̱̬̺̫̥̱̳̱̣̰̫̯̫̱̥̫̭̰̱̱̤̱̥͂ Ӱ̸̨̱̲̳̱̻̰̰̾ 
̵̨ ̵̭̱ ̵̧̧̨̨̲̱̳̩̫̥̣ ̵̴̵̴̨̨̣̰̫̯̫̭̫ ̫ ̴̷̴̨̨̭̰̱̱̤̭̫ ̨̭̮̫̻ Ӱ
  ̵̨ ̵̭̱ ̴̵̵̨̺̫̣ ̵̺̱ ̶̴̴̨̳̭̫ ̧̱̮̩̰̾ ̵̨̫̯̿ ̶̴̵̨̨̲̳̫̯̼̥̣
̨̨̧̲̳ ̶̧̳̦̫̯̫ ̫̮̫ ̵̺̱ ̵̨̧̨̲̳̪̫̰ ̧̨̱̮̩̰ ̵̤̾̿ ̶̴̴̳̭̫̯ Ӱ
  ̳̫̒ ̵̱̯̀ ̵̴̵̨̣̰̫̯̫̫̪̯ ̨̱̺̰̿ ̯̣̳̦̫̰̣̮̫̪̫̳̱̥̣̰ ̫
̵̶̵̴̷̴̴̨̨̨̨̧̭̱̰̹̰̳̫̳̰̣̲̳̫̳̫̫̦̳̣̩̣̰̭̱̬̫̱̹̫̣̮̰̱̬̩̫̪̰̫͂̿
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̵̴̵̴̴̵̵̴̶̴̵̴̨̨̨̨̨̨̨̨̣̣̰̫̯̫̭̫̳̱̫̲̫̭̮̫̻̼̥̰̰̱̱̮̣̤̮̫̰̱̰̾
̶̸̵̴̴̴̵̴̧̧̧̨̱̫̪̯̣̱̥̱̦̱̱̪̰̣̰̫̦̱̥̱̳̫̥̱̭̮̣͂͂͂ 120
4XLWHVLPSO\WKHUHGRQӵWDSSHDUWREHHQRXJKFRPPLWWHGDQWL6HPLWHVLQ5XVVLDWR
PDNHDVLJQLFDQWHOHFWRUDOGLHUHQFH XQOHVVRIFRXUVHDGLUHFWFKDOOHQJHUWR3XWLQIRU
the presidency were Jewish, in which case the popular opposition to a Jewish president
ZRXOGOLNHO\PDNHDGLHUHQFH 
Interestingly, the tendency of Russians to believe anti-Semitism conspiracy theories
and alternative histories may also be declining. According to a Levada Center survey,
UHVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHG+RORFDXVWGHQLDODVLJQLFDQWO\VPDOOHUSURSRUWLRQRIWKHWLPH
in May 2015 than in October 2007.121
A recent study from the World Jewish Congress and the Russian Jewish Congress
supports this trend, and suggests plausible explanations for why.
Russia today has one of the lowest levels of anti-Semitism in the
world and the lowest in Europe, according to a survey conducted in
E\WKH5XVVLDQ-HZLVK&RQJUHVVDKHDGRIWKHUVW0RVFRZ
International Conference on Combating anti-Semitism, co-sponsored
by the World Jewish Congress.
The survey found that only 8 percent of respondents expressed a
QHJDWLYH DWWLWXGH WRZDUG -HZV DQG WKDW  RI 5XVVLDQV WRGD\ DUH
aware of the Holocaust. The study found that Gypsies and Chechens
evoked the most antipathetic attitude among respondents, as well as
xenophobia toward Americans, Arabs and Azerbaijanis.122
The most likely explanation for this dramatic decline in popular anti-Semitism in
Russia may be attributed not only to the dramatic decrease in the Jewish population,
but also to the abandonment of a coordinated, mass anti-Semitic program by Russian
elites. While the siloviki likely practice employment discrimination in the Russian
government, Russian mass media since the 2000 have been devoid of the kind of largeVFDOHDQWL6HPLWLFPHVVDJHVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH6RYLHWHUDLQZKLFKӷ,QPHGLDQRYHOV
and movies, Jews were almost never shown in a positive light. A Jewish name could only
DSSHDULQDQHJDWLYHFRQWH[WӸ123 By contrast:

120

123

ӷ̵̴̵̨̨̧̨̰̫̯̫̫̪̯̰̥̯̱̃Ӹ>$QWL6HPLWLVPLV1RWLQ6W\OH@̵̨̧̨̥̣̣̹̰̳̎ODVWXSGDWHG
November 7, 2016, last accessed November 20, 2017.
ӷ̴̴̨̧̨̨̧̰̱̹̫̣̳̯̰̭̱̦̱̫̥̳̬̭̱̦̱̰̣̳̱̱̥̆͂Ӹ>*HQRFLGHRIWKH$UPHQLDQDQG-HZLVK
3HRSOHV@̵̨̧̨̥̣̣̹̰̳̎/DVWPRGLHG-XQH/DVWDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
ӷ5XVVLD+DV2QHRI/RZHVW5DWHVRI$QWL6HPLWLVPLQWKH:RUOG6XUYH\&RQGXFWHGE\
5XVVLDQ-HZLVK&RQJUHVV)LQGVӸ:RUOG-HZLVK&RQJUHVVODVWPRGLHG1RYHPEHU
accessed November 30, 2017.
6KODSHQWRNKӷ3XWLQDVD)OH[LEOHӸ
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3XWLQӵVFORVHFRQGDQWWKHIDPRXVOPGLUHFWRU1LNLWD0LNKDONRY
made a movie in 2007 called 12 (a remake of the American movie
12 Angry Men), which denounces anti-Semitism and other ethnic
SUHMXGLFHVLQ5XVVLD7KHVFUHHQLQJRIVXFKDOPZRXOGEHDEVROXWHO\
impossible not only between the 1940s and the 1980s, but even in
<HOWVLQӵVWLPH124
At least some of the credit for the near eradication of anti-Semitism from mass
entertainment in Russia could be attributed to Putin, who has exerted direct or indirect
control over almost every aspect and outlet of mass information and entertainment in
the country since the early 2000s.
,WLVGLFXOWWRFRQFOXGHWKHGLUHFWLRQDOLW\RIWKHUHJLPHӵV-HZLVKSROLFLHVDQGSXEOLF
RSLQLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKHӷV\ULQJHӸWKHRU\WKHJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGXVHLWVGRPLQDWLRQRI
PDVVLQIRUPDWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVHWRӷLQMHFWӸDQWL6HPLWLVPLQWRWKHSRSXODWLRQ
at will. It has clearly not done so. If the theory is incorrect, the Kremlin’s options of
ideological positions are limited based on what the Russian population is prepared and
likely to accept. Rather than manipulating political discourse and culture with complete
GH[WHULW\WRPHHWLWVQHHGVWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWPD\QGLWVHOILQDSRVLWLRQPXFK
closer to that of a democratic government, fairly tightly constrained to philosophical
and ideological positions that the population is prepared to accept. Based on survey
data, the Russian population is historically and increasingly resilient to anti-Semitism
since the turn of the millennium.
Alternately, if the theory is correct, then the drop in anti-Semitism since the beginning
RI3XWLQӵVUVWSUHVLGHQWLDOWHUPLVGLUHFWO\DWWULEXWDEOHWRSROLFLHVRIKLVJRYHUQPHQW
Consequently, the observed trends are wholly subject to manipulation and could be
reversed at any time. The longevity and stability of the Putin government’s pro-Jewish
policies therefore requires further explanation. Since Putin took power, the Russian
government’s economic policy has changed drastically, as have political rights, the
Constitution, the judiciary, Russia’s foreign policy (including perhaps the underlying
goals of foreign policy in addition to the policies themselves), and arguably the nature
RIWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDFW5KHWRULFDOFKDQJHVIURPWKHSUHVLGHQWDQGRWKHU.UHPOLQRFLDOV
have accompanied each of these shifts. The government’s Jewish policies have been one
GRPDLQRIUHPDUNDEOHFRQVLVWHQF\ZKLFKWKHӷV\ULQJHӸK\SRWKHVLVFDQQRWH[SODLQE\
itself.

The foreign policy hypothesis
Israel
In contrast to each theory discussed so far, another theory explains Putin’s and his
JRYHUQPHQWӵVSUR6HPLWLFSROLFLHVDVIDFHWVRIDODUJHUIRUHLJQSROLF\<HYJHQLD$OEDWV
124
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suggests that, to some extent, the Russian government’s relationship with its Jewish
population is dictated by its geopolitical posture in the Middle East. This proposition
is unique among analyses of Putin’s Jewish policies, and warrants more research. It’s
LPSOLFDWLRQVEDVHGRQZKDWLVDOUHDG\NQRZQRI5XVVLDQIRUHLJQSROLF\DUHVLJQLFDQW
As Albats argues, the nature of the Russian-Israeli relationship is multifaceted, and Israel
FRXOGSOD\DQ\RIVHYHUDOGLHUHQWUROHVLQWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\RI3XWLQӵVJRYHUQPHQW
7KHUVWIDFHWRI5XVVLDQ,VUDHOLUHODWLRQVLVWKHODUJHQXPEHURI5XVVRSKRQH,VUDHOLV
As of 2016, there were about 1.5 million Russian-speaking Israelis, the vast majority of
whom had immigrated from Russia or Ukraine.125 According to Agnia Grigas’s work
RQ3XWLQӵVXVHRIӷFRPSDWULRWVӸLQIRUHLJQSROLF\5XVVLDQVSHDNLQJ,VUDHOLVPD\EHD
sizeable and important compatriot community.
The present-day concept of the Russian compatriot both stems from
DQGUHODWHVWRDEURDGHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH5XVVLDQQDWLRQӿ7KH
UVWFRQFHSWLRQHPSKDVL]HVWKH>6RYLHW@8QLRQ RULPSHULDO LGHQWLW\ӿ
According to this conceptualization of Russian nationhood, Russian
compatriots would include all former citizens of the USSR and their
descendants. A second way to conceptualize the Russian nation is to
LQFOXGHWKHHQWLUHFRPPXQLW\RI(DVWHUQ6ODYVӿ7KHWKLUGFRQFHSWLRQ
of the Russian nation inclines instead to a broader vision, including
DOOZKRXVH5XVVLDQDVWKHLUUVWRUKDELWXDOODQJXDJHUHJDUGOHVVRI
their ethnicity.126
These conceptions of compatriots, however, apply perfectly well to Russophone
,VUDHOLVPDQ\RIZKRPZHUHERUQLQWKHIRUPHU6RYLHW8QLRQDQGXVH5XVVLDQDVDUVW
and habitual language. For the purposes of Russian soft power, this makes Russian
Jews a potentially useful group. For the purposes of Russian expansionism and neoLPSHULDOLVP ZKLFK *ULJDV LGHQWLHV DV WKH SULPDU\ JRDOV RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ 5XVVLD
compatriot policies, the Russophone Israeli population may play a weaker version of
the role played by analogous populations in the former Soviet Republics: They give
Russia a reason to claim legitimate political interest in a country or region. While this
will likely not lead to military intervention in Israel as in Georgia and Ukraine (and
possibly other countries in the future) it may help Russia legitimate a resurgent Middle
(DVWSROLF\PDNLQJXSIRULWVORVW$UDEDOOLHV$VDQDGGHGEHQHW3XWLQӵVJRYHUQPHQW
may also hope that Russian-speakers in Israel may be a politically malleable voting bloc
– an especially useful asset in a country that has historically been one of the closest and
most strategically important allies of the Unites States. Whether or not this is possible
KDV\HWWREHWHVWHG*LYHQWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWӵVLQXHQFHFDPSDLJQVLQHOHFWLRQV

125
126

$PDQGD%RUVFKHO'DQӷ<HDUV/DWHU5XVVLDQ6SHDNHUV6WLOOWKHӴ2WKHUӵLQ,VUDHO6D\V
0.ӸeȈȝǲȸȤǾ2ȸȵǙǲȘODVWPRGLHG6HSWHPEHUDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea QS<DOH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 
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LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHFOHDYDJHEHWZHHQ5XVVRSKRQHDQGQDWLYHӷ6DEUDӸ,VUDHOLVPD\
be exactly the kind of social schism open to exploitation.127
&RXUWLQJ 5XVVRSKRQH ,VUDHOL -HZV ZRXOG EH VLJQLFDQWO\ KDUGHU IRU D UHJLPH WKDW
persecuted Jews at home – or, at least, for a regime that gained a reputation for doing
VR3XWLQӵVSUR6HPLWLVPPD\EHSDUWO\PRWLYDWHGE\DQHRUWWRJDLQLQXHQFHZLWK
Jews in the Middle East, which is a region of strategic importance in which Russia has
ORVWVLJQLFDQWLQXHQFHLQWKHSDVWTXDUWHUFHQWXU\
The second facet of Russian-Israeli relations that Albats lists appears on its surface less
sinister. Russian businessmen and oligarchs – Jews and non-Jews alike – have interests
LQPDQ\ZHDOWK\:HVWHUQUVWZRUOGFRXQWULHVDVGRPDJQDWHVDQGW\FRRQVWKHZRUOG
over. As dissident journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza put it,
They want to rule inside Russia like it’s a third-world dictatorship,
violating basic human rights and freedoms, but they themselves want
to use the privileges and the opportunities that the Western world
RHUV IRU WKHPVHOYHV DQG IRU WKHLU IDPLOLHV 7KH\ ZDQW WR VWHDO LQ
Russia and spend in the West.128
0DLQWDLQLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRH[VRIWSRZHUZLWK,VUDHOӵV5XVVRSKRQHPLQRULW\PD\
be a way to preserve Israel as an outlet for spending and education by the Kremlin elite
outside Russia. Israel has one of the most promising Western economies that has not
yet passed a Magnitsky Law designed to curtail the ability of Kremlin-linked silovikicum-oligarchs who have abused human rights to spend money in and travel to Western
countries. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Lithuania
have such laws. While avoidance of Magnitsky sanctions cannot explain Putin’s Jewish
policies before 2012, when the American Magnitsky Act was signed, it may explain the
continuation of such policies and their relationship to Russia’s close relationship with
Israel.
The Western Far-Left
Beyond Russia’s relationship with Israel in particular, there are other blind spots
regarding Russia’s foreign policy that warrant further investigation. Péter Krekó’s
research regarding the Putin government’s support for and relationships with Western
far-left parties and forces suggests that the recent work of Clover, Shokhovtsov, and
others warrants equally thorough, complementary work on the other end of the
spectrum.
127
128

6KDXQ:DONHUӷ5XVVLDQ7UROO)DFWRU\3DLG86$FWLYLVWVWR+HOS)XQG3URWHVWVGXULQJ
(OHFWLRQӸ7KH*XDUGLDQODVWPRGLHG2FWREHUDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
%HQMDPLQ3DUNHUӷ7KH2WKHU5XVVLD3RLVRQLQJVӴ$FFLGHQWVӵDQG$VVDVVLQDWLRQVӸThe Weekly
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7KHVSHFLFRSLQLRQVDQGSROLFLHVRI(XURSHDQIDUOHIWSDUWLHVUHJDUGLQJ-HZVLVRIWHQ
GLFXOWWRGLVFHUQ2QHLOOXVWUDWLYHH[DPSOHLVWKH&RPPXQLVW3DUW\RI%RKHPLDDQG
0RUDYLD .6Î0  WKH PRVW SURPLQHQW IDUOHIW SDUW\ LQ &]HFKLD DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR
Krekó, one of the most successful in Europe129. The party takes a very critical approach
to the Israeli policies regarding the West Bank and Gaza and questions the legitimacy of
the State of Israel per se, but stops short of further, explicit anti-Semitism130.
2QH RI WKH PHWKRGV .UHNµ LGHQWLHV WKDW WKH .UHPOLQ XVHV WR HOLFLW V\PSDWK\ ZLWK
European far-left parties is anti-fascism:
Just as Putin’s regime simultaneously warns of the rise of the far
right and supports (and is supported by) far-right parties in Europe,
WKHUDGLFDOOHIWӵVDQWLIDVFLVPLVRIWHQVHOHFWLYHDQGRQHVLGHGӿ3DEOR
,JOHVLDV OHDGHU RI 3RGHPRV DGGHG ӷWKH (8 VXSSRUWHG WKH LOOHJDO
change of power in Ukraine and the coming of a neo-Nazi party to the
Ukrainian government. Some European leaders, together with neoNazis, took part in public events in Ukraine, and this is too far from
(XURSHDQYDOXHVӸ%XWDWWKHVDPHWLPHD'LH/LQNHGHOHJDWLRQZHQW
to Eastern Ukraine to have a friendly meeting with notoriously antiSemitic leaders of the Donetsk Republic131.
Though Die Linke may prove to be an exception, it is possible that Putin’s government
EHOLHYHV Ӱ DQG SHUKDSV ULJKWO\ Ӱ WKDW QRWRULRXV RFLDO DQWL6HPLWLVP PD\ ZHDNHQ
its ability to win support for its causes among the Western far-left. The origins of
(XURSHDQXQLFDWLRQOLHLQWKHFRQDJUDWLRQRI:RUOG:DU,,LQFOXGLQJWKH+RORFDXVW
The European Union and its predecessor organizations were largely formed to prevent
another war. For the Kremlin to adopt policies resembling Nazi Germany would
severely undercut its ability to label its enemies as fascists and garner support for its
international objectives.
Concurrently, it would also hamper the Kremlin’s abilities to create symmetry between
itself and its European enemies.
For radical left politicians, who have more inhibitions about praising Putin and his
regime directly, a typical and more subtle argumentation is to talk about aggressors
on both sides. For example, without even mentioning the occupation of Crimea, a
VWDWHPHQWE\WKH&RPPXQLVW3DUW\RI%RKHPLDDQG0RUDYLDFDOOHGRQӷWKHSDUWLHVӸ
to respect the Helsinki Accords one day before the referendum, as if Ukraine were not
occupied only by Russia – but by the EU and the US as well.132
129
130
131
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3«WHU.UHNµDQG/µU£QW*\ēUL[ɂȸȸȈǙǙȞǮȿȅǲɂȵȤȱǲǙȞ'Ǚȵ@ǲǾȿ (n.p.: Political Capital
Institute, n.d.), 2.
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PRGHG6HSWHPEHUDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
.UHNµDQG*\ēULRussia and the European, 8.
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While many far-left parties center their platforms on opposition the Washington
consensus of free trade and market capitalism, the Nazi comparison might prove too
much for Western far-left parties to associate themselves with Russia.
According to Krekó, the Putin government relies on a modicum of reasonableness to
VHFXUHVXSSRUWIURPWKH(XURSHDQIDUOHIWӷ7KHOHIWӵVDOLDWLRQZLWKWKH.UHPOLQLV
better explained via the ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ principle, such as selective
anti-imperialism, anticapitalism, and anti-Americanism. Likewise, the state-controlled
economy, which promises to keep ‘big capital’ in check, is an attractive model for many
DQWLFDSLWDOLVWVӸ133 Although some far-left parties may not see anti-Semitism on the
part of the Russian government as reason to sever or degrade ties with or support for
Russian positions, there may be enough other groups that would choose to disassociate
WKHPVHOYHV WKDW WKH\ FRXOG GLPLQLVK LQXHQFH ZLWK WKH OHIWLVW EORF ZULW ODUJH ,W LV
possible that, if enough far-left parties were to diminish their support for Russian goals,
WKHUHVWZRXOGIROORZIRUWKHVDNHRIEORFXQLW\ӷUDGLFDOOHIWIRUFHVDUHWUDGLWLRQDOO\PRUH
willing to cooperate with one another on the international and European level than the
IDUULJKW7KLVIXUWKHULQFUHDVHVWKHLULPSRUWDQFHӸ134 That support is important for the
Putin government’s foreign policies, often giving it the sheen of legitimacy that allows
LWV IRUHLJQ LQWHUYHQWLRQV WR VXFFHHG ӷ7KH UDGLFDO OHIW JURXS (XURSHDQ 8QLWHG /HIW
Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament supports the Kremlin
ZLWKZRUGVDQGYRWHV LQRIWKHFDVHV LQWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHDQG26&(JHQHUDO
DVVHPEOLHVӱHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQLWFRPHVWRLVVXHVRQ8NUDLQHDQG6\ULDӸ135
Radical left parties in Europe and the West more broadly may be fringe forces for now,
EXWE\GHQLWLRQWKHLUXOWLPDWHSXUSRVHLVWRJDLQSROLWLFDOSRZHU7KH\FDQQRWUHO\
exclusively on Russian support to achieve that goal; eventually they will have to achieve
popular support. Anti-Semitism on the part of the Putin government might lose them
popular support, which would diminish their utility to the Kremlin either by causing
WKHPWRSXOODZD\IURPWKH.UHPOLQRUE\GLPLQLVKLQJWKHLULQXHQFHGRPHVWLFDOO\
These theories are little more than speculation compared to what is now known about
the Kremlin’s courtship of the Western far-right. More research regarding the Putin
government’s courtship of the far-left will provide a more detailed, full depiction of
how Russian policy has been shaped in response to Western institutions and political
forces, and how those institutions and forces have in turn responded to Russian policy.

The biographical hypothesis
Putin’s remarkable pro-Semitic policies may be inspired by his own biography, which

133
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5DGLFDO/HIWDQG5XVVLDӸR'55XVVLDDQG%H\RQGODVWPRGLHG-XQHDFFHVVHG
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includes benevolent interventions by many Jews. One example is the Jewish family that
shared Putin’s communal apartment in St. Petersburg:
An elderly couple shared one room in the apartment; an observant Jewish
family, with an older daughter, Hava, shared the other. The younger
Vladimir, the only child in the communal home, remembered the elderly
couple fondly, and spent as much time with them as with his parents. They
became surrogate grandparents, and he knew her as Baba Anya. She, like his
mother, possessed deep religious faith.136
An early religious experience of Putin’s may also have impressed on him that Jews are
not a threat to Orthodoxy or Russian culture as he may perceive other religions to be:
As Vladimir would later tell the story, on November 21, when he was
seven weeks old, Baba Anya and Maria walked three blocks through the
ZLQWHUFKLOOWRWKH7UDQVJXUDWLRQ&DWKHGUDOD\HOORZHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\
monument built in the neoclassical style of many of the city’s churches, and
there they secretly baptized the boy.137
$QRWKHUJXUHZKRDSSHDUVWRKDYHKDGDJUHDWLPSDFWRQ3XWLQӵVOLIHӰE\KLVRZQ
DGPLVVLRQ Ӱ ZDV KLV UVW MXGR FRDFK ӷ+H WDONHG DERXW KLV -HZLVK ZUHVWOLQJ FRDFK
Anatolii Rakhlin as a person who ‘probably played the crucial role in my life.’ The
coach had attracted him to serious sports and drew him away from a dangerous life on
WKHVWUHHWVӸ1387KHLQXHQFHRIMXGRDQGWKHUHIRUHRI5DNKOLQRQ3XWLQӵVOLIHFDQQRWEH
underestimated:
The discipline and rigor of sambo, and later judo, intrigued the boy [Putin]
in a way nothing else had. The martial arts transformed his life, giving him
WKHPHDQVRIDVVHUWLQJKLPVHOIDJDLQVWODUJHUWRXJKHUER\Vӷ,WZDVDWRROWR
DVVHUWP\VHOILQWKHSDFNӸKHZRXOGVD\,WDOVREURXJKWKLPDQHZFLUFOHRI
friends, especially two brothers, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, who would
stick by him throughout his life. The martial arts gave him an orthodoxy
he found neither in religion nor in politics. It was more than mere sport, he
believed; it was a philosophy.139
7KH LQXHQFH RI VSRUWV DQG WKH GLVFLSOLQH RI PDUWLDO DUWV RQ 3XWLQӵV OLIH FDQ EH VHHQ
DVDQLQXHQFHRQ3XWLQӵVSULRULWLHVDQGSROLFLHVRQFHLQRFHPRVWVLJQLFDQWO\WKH
GHGLFDWHGHRUWWRKRVWWKH2O\PSLFJDPHVLQ5XVVLD7KHVHHPLQJO\LOORJLFDOFKRLFHRI
a sub-tropical city for the 2014 Winter Games can be ascribed to Putin’s personal
136
137
138
139

Steven Lee Myers, eȅǲFǲ͡eȸǙȵeȅǲ[ȈȸǲǙȞǮ[ǲȈǿȞȤǾtȘǙǮȈȝȈȵXɂȿȈȞ 1HZ<RUN$OIUHG$
Knopf, 2015), 13.
Ibid., 12-13
6KODSHQWRNKӷ3XWLQDVD)OH[LEOHӸ
Ibid., 15-16
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intervention and determination. The city was a favorite of his, perhaps even surpassing
that of his native St. Petersburg.140
On behalf of his beloved Sochi, he vigorously worked to lobby the International
2O\PSLF&RPPLWWHHӷӴ+HZDVQLFHӵ-HDQ&ODXGH.LOO\WKH)UHQFKVNLFKDPSLRQDQGD
member of the International Olympic Committee, explained after the vote. ‘He spoke
)UHQFKӱ KH QHYHU VSHDNV )UHQFK +H VSRNH (QJOLVKӱ KH QHYHU VSHDNV (QJOLVK 7KH
3XWLQFKDULVPDFDQH[SODLQIRXUYRWHVӵӸ141 Although Putin learned German as a second
ODQJXDJH WR XHQF\ DV D \RXQJ PDQ DQG OLYHG LQ 'UHVGHQ DV D .*% RFHU KH KDG
indeed, never spoken French or English in public (with the exception of some public
singing). He most likely learned those sections of his address phonetically, an indicator
of his determination to impress the committee and secure the Olympics for his adopted
city and his country.
7KDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVLQVHSDUDEOHIURPKLVSROLWLFDODLPVӷ$VDQDYLGVSRUWVPDQDQG
WQHVVREVHVVLYHDMXGRNDDVNLHUDQGDVZLPPHU3XWLQORYHGWKH2O\PSLFVDVDOHDGHU
KHVDZKRVWLQJWKHPDVWKHPHDQVWRDUP5XVVLDӵVUHWXUQWRLWVULJKWIXOSODFHRQWKH
ZRUOGVWDJHӸ142 As is characteristic of Putin’s personalized rule, the status of the country
is inextricably linked with the status of its ruler. His priorities are its priorities, and his
achievement is its achievement. The Sochi Olympics were to Putin what the Field of
the Cloth of Gold was for Francis I (or, perhaps, for Henry): a feat of splendor and
athletic prowess intended to impress rivals and display the grandeur of the nation and
LWVVRYHUHLJQ7KLVLVH[DFWO\KRZWKHHYHQWZDVGHVFULEHGE\JRYHUQPHQWRFLDOV3XWLQ
included, when it was announced that Sochi had been selected:
When [Putin] returned triumphantly to Moscow, he stepped out of his
MHW DQG PHW DVVHPEOHG UHSRUWHUV DW WKH 9,3 KDOO RI 9QXNRYR $LUSRUW ӷ,W
LV EH\RQG DQ\ GRXEW D MXGJPHQW RI RXU FRXQWU\Ӹ KH GHFODUHG 2QO\ LQ
DFRXQWU\GHVSHUDWHIRUDUPDWLRQFRXOGWKHFKRLFHRIDQ2O\PSLFVKDYH
ORRPHG VR GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\ ODUJH ӷ5XVVLD KDV ULVHQ IURP LWV NQHHVӸ
German Gref declared in Guatemala City.143
The Sochi Olympics, despite their often critical foreign coverage for sub-par
accommodations, vast corruption, and the attendant doping scandal, were a feather in
Putin’s cap domestically. Immediately after the Olympics, his approval rating inside
Russia spiked to 85 percent.144 (Of course, public opinion surveys in Russia are always
VXEMHFWWRVNHSWLFLVPDQGWKHHHFWVRIWKH2O\PSLFVDORQHDUHDOPRVWLPSRVVLEOH
WRVHSDUDWHIURPWKHHHFWVRIWKHDOPRVWVLPXOWDQHRXVLQYDVLRQDQGDQQH[DWLRQRI
Crimea within days of the closing ceremonies in February 2014.) In this way, some of
Putin’s most notable political success – both the beginning of the serious, focused part
140
141
142
143
144

Ibid., 243
Ibid., 325
Ibid., 323.
Ibid., 325.
6DHHG$KPHGӷ9ODGLPLU3XWLQӵV$SSURYDO5DWLQJ"1RZDWD:KRSSLQJӸ&11FRP
ODVWPRGLHG)HEUXDU\DFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
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of his life and his greatest international spectacle – are the result of early guidance by a
Jew, Rakhlin, whom Putin admires immensely.
The other formative experience in Putin’s life was his career in the KGB, which was
made possible by his early study of German. This was encouraged and mentored
E\9HUD'PLWULHYQD*XUHYLFKDQGODWHUFRQWLQXHGE\0LQD<XGLWVND\D QRZ0LQD
<XGLWVND\D%HUOLQHU %HUOLQHULV-HZLVKDQGQRZOLYHVLQ7HO$YLYLQDQDSDUWPHQW
Putin bought for her as a demonstration of his appreciation for her teaching many
years before145. Putin bought the apartment for her while on a state visit in 2005,
although it was not disclosed for some years. The private nature of the gesture
(Berliner was the one who revealed it), as well as its substance, indicate the genuineness
RIWKHJUDWLWXGHWKDWPRWLYDWHGLWӷ6KH>KDG@DGHHSLQXHQFHRQKLPDQGKHZRXOG
UHPHPEHUKHUGHFDGHVODWHUZLWKDVHQWLPHQWDOIRQGQHVVӸ146
Many of those personally close and important to Putin are rewarded with expensive
gifts, sometimes including multi-billion-dollar businesses, as in the cases of Arkady
and Boris Rotenberg, who jointly control SGM group and have over $1 billion in
assets each, thanks to their friendship with Putin stemming from their shared dojo in
St. Petersburg.147 The Rotenbergs are also of Jewish ancestry.148
While Putin appears to have very close relationships with many Jews and does not appear
to discriminate against Jews per se, it bears mentioning that the same cannot be said of his
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQDWHYHU\OHYHO$OWKRXJKWKHVFKRODUVKLSRQRFLDOVWDWHDQWL6HPLWLVP
in Russia has been lacking recently, Evgenia Albats believes the prevalence of siloviki, or
WRXVHKHUWHUPӷHSDXOHWWHVӸLQWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWKDVFDXVHGVRPHEDFNVOLGLQJ
toward the Soviet-era anti-Semitic policies. This has been especially pronounced during
Putin’s third presidential term, and can be attributed to those in Putin’s inner circle who
don’t share his pro-Semitic tendencies.149 For example, Igor Sechin and Sergey Ivanov
DUHERWKDQWL6HPLWHVLQWKH.*%WUDGLWLRQZKLFKFRQVLGHUVDOO-HZVSRWHQWLDOӷIWK
FROXPQLVWVӸDQGLQKHUHQWO\XQWUXVWZRUWK\ 7KHVHDUHWKHRSLQLRQVRI$OEDWVWKRXJK
GHWDLOHGHYLGHQFHLVRIFRXUVHGLFXOWWRQG150 $FFRUGLQJWRKHUӷ,WӵVKDUGHUIRU
Jews to get into these governmental structures – the Kremlin, the administration, etc.
That would be because the most important decision-making sphere of the country are
FRQWUROOHGE\.*%SHRSOHӸ7KLVPDNHV3XWLQDQH[FHSWLRQKDYLQJVHUYHGIRU\HDUVLQ
the KGB and its successor, the FSB, but apparently having not bought into its pervasive
anti-Semitism.
145

149
150

&QDDQ/LSKVKL]ӷ:KHQ3XWLQ0HW+LV-HZLVK*HUPDQ7HDFKHULQ,VUDHOӸ7KH7LPHVRI
,VUDHOODVWPRGLHG0DUFKDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
Myers, The New Tsar, 19.
7RP0LOHVӷ866DQFWLRQV+LW*XQYRU&RIRXQGHU5RWHQEHUJ%URWKHUVӸ5HXWHUVODVW
PRGLHG0DUFKDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
6KHOGRQ.LUVKQHUӷ5XVVLDӵV1HZ7VDUӸeȅǲeȈȝǲȸȤǾ2ȸȵǙǲȘODVWPRGLHG1RYHPEHU
2015, accessed November 29, 2017.
,QWHUYLHZZLWK<HYJHQLD$OEDWV
+DDUHW]ODVWPRGLHG-XO\DFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
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Albats’s analysis squares with other theories of power distribution in contemporary
Russia, which recognize that the concentration of power in Putin’s hands also
concentrates power in the hands of those around him, who by necessity have some
degree of autonomy – autonomy which has increased, especially regarding the FSB, since
3XWLQӵVUHWXUQWRWKHSUHVLGHQF\ӷ,Q3UHVLGHQW3XWLQFRXOGLQXHQFHDVHYHUDO
government organs completely independent from him; his power even encompassed
WKH JUHDW DQG WHUULEOH UH VXSHUYLVLRQ DXWKRULW\ %XW LQ  SUHVLGHQW 3XWLQ
LVXQDEOHWRLQXHQFHDQXPEHURIERGLHVLQGHSHQGHQWIURPKLP ̵̶̧̱̥̦̱̅
̵̶̵̵̴̴̸̵̨̧̨̧̨̨̨̨̲̳̪̫̰̫̰̯̱̦̲̱̥̮̫̰̣̳̱̥̳̻̰̰̱̰̪̣̥̫̫̯̱̰̦̱̱̳̦̣̰̱̥̒͂̿͂̾
̶̴̵̴̴̵̴̶̴̨̨̧̨̨̧̦̱̯̱̦̼̥̱̣̩̳̣̲̳̱̳̣̰̮̱̰̣̥̮̫̭̫̬̫̩̣̰̬̲̱̩̣̳̰̬̰̣̪̱̳͂̿̾̾
̥̃Ӱ̸̵̶̵̵̵̴̸̵̧̨̧̨̨̨̧̨̦̱̣̲̳̪̫̰̫̰̰̯̱̩̲̱̥̮̫̰̣̳̰̪̣̥̫̫̯̱̒͂̿͂̾
̨̰̦̱̱̳̦̣̰̱̥ Ӹ151
This followed closely on the heels of the prosecution of director Kirill Serebrennikov,
to which Putin expressed his opposition publicly, but which continued and even
LQWHQVLHGQRQHWKHOHVV
Shortly after the initial questioning of Serebrennikov in May, the
Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was asked about the incident by
DQDFWRUDWD.UHPOLQUHFHSWLRQ+HUHVSRQGHGӷ)RROVӸDSSDUHQWO\
referring to the investigators. This was seen by some as a sign from the
Kremlin to stop the campaign against the director; instead, Russian
DXWKRULWLHVKDYHLQWHQVLHGLW152
,I WKH VWDWHPHQWV ZHUH D WUXH UHHFWLRQ RI 3XWLQӵV SROLF\ SUHIHUHQFHV WKLV FRXOG EH
another example of subordinate bodies – particularly the FSB – acting against Putin’s
wishes, potentially embarrassing the president (though in retrospect this seems unlikely,
and it’s equally possible that Putin was intentionally portraying himself as the good tsar
surrounded by bad boyars).
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFK3XWLQӵVSUR6HPLWLFSROLFLHVQGWKHLUIRXQGDWLRQLQKLVSHUVRQDO
relationships with Jews also necessarily depends on the nature of Putin’s rule in general,
including the degree of autonomy which he delegates to those around him, how tolerant
he is of opposition and dissent within the inner circles of his regime, and the relationship
between his personal biography and preferences and his rule. If the most convincing
explanation for Putin’s pro-Semitism lies in the particular facts of his biography, then it
would be reasonable to infer that other aspects of Putin’s rule and others of his policies
are also inspires by his personal experience, rather than simple managerial pragmatism
or deep ideological commitments.

151
̴̧̨̨̨̰̳̬̱̮̰̫̭̱̥̫̥̦̰̫̮̤̣̹̃̍̈͂̃̿ӷ3̴̵̧̨̱̱̤̳̰̣̪̱̳̫̱̮̣̥̺̰̭̱̒Ӱ̵̶̵̲̳̱̫̥̫̰̣̒"Ӹ
ׂؽرفجرؿجؿٚ࣡Fǲ͡eȈȝǲȸ࣓KǨȿȤǧǲȵࠍ࣓ࠍࠋࠌࠒ. Translation is author’s own.
152
6KDXQ:DONHUӷ$UUHVWRI5XVVLDQ7KHDWUH'LUHFWRU5DLVHV)HDUVRI&ODPSGRZQRQ'LVVHQWӸ
The GuardianODVWPRGLHG$XJXVWDFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU
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Conclusions
No single hypothesis presented above completely explains the Putin regime’s Jewish
policies. Any satisfactory explanation of the policy choices of a regime such as Putin’s
must address both personal and institutional causes and contexts. Consequently, a
combination of these theories is more likely to be a satisfactory explanation, or at least
the beginning of one.
To create a truly robust account of the Russian Jewish policy under Putin – and, indeed,
the political context and structure surrounding it – further research is imperative.
Biographies of Putin are available in English, and can be quite useful in interpreting
his policies, but they are necessarily incomplete. Undoubtedly, Putin warrants further
WUHDWPHQW E\ KLVWRULDQV DIWHU KLV GHDWK ZKHQ KLV OLIH DQG HHFWV RQ 5XVVLD FDQ EH
HYDOXDWHGZKROO\HYHQLIWKHGHSWKRIWKRVHHHFWVPD\QRWEHIXOO\UHDOL]HGIRU\HDUV
Many of the works of the Eurasianist philosophers are not available in English, including
most notably Ilyin’s Nashi Zadachi. He and the other philosophers mentioned were
SUROLF DQG WKHLU ZRUN VKRXOG EH PDGH DYDLODEOH IRU SROLWLFDO VFLHQWLVWV ZRUNLQJ LQ
English. Their work should also be evaluated for is Jewish-related content, which can
further illuminate the debate about the ideological nature of the Putin regime. Lastly,
and perhaps most urgently, the relationships between the Russian government and
far-left forces and parties in the West should be at least as extensively researched as the
corresponding relationship on the right. Péter Krekó is almost alone in pursuing this
LPPHQVHO\LPSRUWDQWIDFHWRILQWHUQDWLRQDODDLUV
The most convincing existing evidence suggests that the Jewish policies of Putin’s
government are primarily motivated by his personal attitudes toward Jews, based on
KLV ELRJUDSK\ ZKLFK LQFOXGHV VHYHUDO QRWDEO\ LQXHQWLDO DQG SRVLWLYH -HZLVK IULHQGV
mentors, and role models. A fuller explanation of Russian Jewish policies will depend
RQWKHRULHVRISROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQDQGLQXHQFHZLWKLQWKH3XWLQJRYHUQPHQWZKLFK
FDQDFFRXQWIRUGHJUHHVRIDXWRQRP\JUDQWHGWRKLJKUDQNLQJRFLDOVLQWKHPLQLVWULHV
the administration, the Duma, and state-controlled corporations.
Possible future changes in Jewish policy in Russia may help elucidate which theory best
explains the Kremlin. A change in Jewish policy – which may already be underway,
TXLHWO\ XQRFLDOO\ Ӱ PD\ VKHG OLJKW RQ KRZ SROLFLHV DUH PDGH LPSOHPHQWHG DQG
changed in the Putin government. They may also support or refute theories about the
ideological or pragmatic nature of the Kremlin regime.
Beyond the implications for understanding Russia and similar regimes, evaluating these
theories may also shed light on the nature of anti-Semitism itself. Explaining the Putin
government’s Jewish policies can provide a case study for the relationship between antiSemitism and politics in other countries. Hopefully, the 21st-century Russia will prove
WREHDVLJQLFDQWH[DPSOHRIDQWL6HPLWLVPEHLQJHUDGLFDWHGLQWKHYHU\SODFHLQZKLFK
it recently thrived.
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